

August 28, 2018

Via Email

William Cogley  
Corporation Counsel  
150 Dexter Court  
Elgin, Illinois 60120-5570  
Cogley\_w@cityofelgin.org

RE: City Code of Elgin. Sec. 10.34.010 – 10.34.030 “Panhandling”

Dear Mr. Cogley,

We write with respect to Section 10.34.010 – 10.34.030 of the Elgin City Code, which prohibits panhandling in a number of manners and locations. These provisions violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 4 of the Illinois Constitution. Since the landmark *Reed v. Gilbert* case in 2015, every panhandling ordinance challenged in federal court – at 25 of 25 to date – including many with features similar to the ones Elgin (“the City”), has been found constitutionally deficient. *See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz.*, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015); *see, e.g. Norton v. City of Springfield, Ill.*, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015); *Thayer v. City of Worcester*, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014), *vacated*, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015), *declaring ordinance unconstitutional on remand*, 2015 WL 6872450, at \*15 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2015)); *see also* National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: A LITIGATION MANUAL (2017), <https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Housing-Not-Handcuffs-Litigation-Manual>. Just last week, the Central District of Illinois invalidated a prohibition on “panhandling while at any time before, during, or after the solicitation knowingly approaching within five feet of the solicited person or intentionally touching the solicited person without the solicited person's consent.” *Norton v. City of Springfield*, 15-3276, 2018 WL 3964800 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2018). At least 31 additional cities have repealed their panhandling ordinances when informed of the likely infringement on First Amendment rights. We therefore ask that the Elgin Police Department immediately cease enforcement of these sections and that the City Council take prompt steps to repeal them.

Courts have long recognized that requesting money is a form of constitutionally protected speech. *See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment*, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (holding charitable solicitation protected by the First Amendment); *Gresham v. Peterson*, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the Court's analysis in *Schaumburg* suggests little reason to distinguish between beggars and charities in terms of the First Amendment protection for their speech.”)

The Ordinance overtly distinguishes between types of speech based on “subject matter ... function or purpose.” See *Reed*, 135 S.Ct. at 2227 (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted; See, e.g., *Norton*, 806 F.3d at 412-13 (“Any law distinguishing one kind of speech from another by reference to its meaning now requires a compelling justification.”)). The Ordinance defines panhandling as “any solicitation...in which a person requests the immediate receipt of funds from other persons in a continuous and repetitive manner,” and then places other restrictions on locations and activities that should not be combined with panhandling. Elgin, Ill. Code § 10.34.020-030. The Ordinance is content-based because it restricts the content of a person’s speech—asking for money. It is not neutral because other types of speech, such as political campaigning, catcalling, evangelizing, or asking for signatures are not restricted by the Ordinance.

As a result, the Ordinance is a “content-based” restriction on speech that is presumptively unconstitutional. See *Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz.*, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015); *Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum*, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). Courts use the most stringent standard – strict scrutiny – to review such restrictions. See, e.g., *Reed*, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (holding that content-based laws may only survive strict scrutiny if “the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”); *McCullen v. Coakley*, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014). The Ordinance cannot survive strict scrutiny because neither does it serve any compelling state interest, nor is it narrowly tailored.

First, the Ordinance serves no compelling state interest. Distaste for a certain type of speech, or a certain type of speaker, is not even a *legitimate* state interest, let alone a *compelling* one. Shielding unwilling listeners from messages disfavored by the state is likewise not a permissible state interest. As the Supreme Court explained, the fact that a listener on a sidewalk cannot “turn the page, change the channel, or leave the Web site” to avoid hearing an uncomfortable message is “a virtue, not a vice.” *McCullen v. Coakley*, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014); *R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn.*, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“The government may not regulate use based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”).

Second, even if the City could identify a compelling state interest, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the Ordinance is “narrowly tailored” to such an interest. Though the Ordinance cites “safety and welfare,” which is an important state interest, the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored to serve it. (citation) *Browne v. City of Grand Junction*, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276 (D. Colo. 2015) (rejecting claims that the ordinance served public safety as unsupported and implausible); *Cutting v. City of Portland*, 802 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2015) (requiring evidence to substantiate claims of public safety). Section 10.34.010 (B) mentions that panhandlers may also engage in aggressive conduct. But it is evident that the Ordinance is not “narrowly tailored” because it outlaws activities that are already banned by other criminal laws. See e.g. *Thayer* at 236. Much of the conduct prohibited by the Ordinance is already prohibited by laws against assault, battery, and obstruction of pedestrian traffic. As a result, the Ordinance cannot be justified on the basis of furthering public safety. The only reason to have a special rule against panhandling while committing these offenses is to target homeless people.

The location restrictions in the Ordinance, which outlaws panhandling in public transit facilities, parks, and roadways, are also unconstitutional. Unsurprisingly, every court to consider

a regulation that, like the Ordinance, bans requests for charity within an identified geographic area has stricken the regulation. *See, e.g., Norton v. City of Springfield*, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015); *Cutting v. City of Portland, Maine*, 802 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2015); *Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach*, 657 F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); *Thayer v. City of Worcester*, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 237 (D. Mass. 2015) (“[M]unicipalities must go back to the drafting board and craft solutions which recognize an individuals... rights under the First Amendment...”); *McLaughlin v. City of Lowell*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (D. Mass. 2015); *Browne v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado*, 2015 WL 5728755, at \*13 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015) (ordinance with buffer zone around bus stops struck down).

The Ordinance also restricts the manner in which people can ask for a charitable donation, including by prohibiting panhandling in a group of two or more persons. Courts have not hesitated to strike regulations that regulate the manner in which a person can ask for a charitable donation, even where the regulation was supposedly justified by a state interest in public safety. And for good reason: restricting people’s behavior on account of their speech is almost always too over-reaching to be narrowly tailored to any compelling governmental interest. *See, e.g., Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville*, 92 F. Supp. 3d 478 (W.D. Va. 2015); *Thayer v. City of Worcester*, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 233 (D. Mass. 2015) (striking down provisions against blocking path and following a person after they gave a negative response); *McLaughlin v. City of Lowell*, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (D. Mass. 2015) (striking down ordinance that prohibited panhandling in group of 2 or more); *Browne v. City of Grand Junction, Colorado*, 2015 WL 5728755, at \*12-13 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015) (“[T]he Court does not believe[] that a repeated request for money or other thing of value necessarily threatens public safety.”).]


For these reasons, among others, the Ordinance cannot pass constitutional muster. Further, it is simply not good policy. Harassing, ticketing and/or arresting people who ask for help in a time of need is inhumane and counterproductive. Unlawful anti-panhandling ordinances such as Elgin’s Panhandling Ordinance are costly to enforce and only exacerbate problems associated with homelessness and poverty. Numerous communities have created alternatives that are more effective, and leave all involved—homeless and non-homeless residents, businesses, city agencies, and elected officials—happier in the long run. *See National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES* (2016), <https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Housing-Not-Handcuffs>.

For example, Philadelphia, PA recently greatly reduced the number of homeless persons asking for change in a downtown subway station by donating an abandoned section of the station to a service provider for use as a day shelter. *See Nina Feldman, Expanded Hub of Hope homeless center opening under Suburban Station, WHYY* (Jan. 30, 2018) <https://whyy.org/articles/expanded-hub-hope-homeless-center-opening-suburban-station/>. In opening the Center, Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenny emphasized “We are not going to arrest people for being homeless,” stressing that the new space “gives our homeless outreach workers and the police a place to actually bring people instead of just scooting them along.” These programs are how cities actually solve the problem of homelessness, rather than merely addressing its symptoms.

We can all agree that we would like to see an Elgin where homeless people are not forced to beg on the streets. But whether examined from a legal, policy, fiscal, or moral standpoint, criminalizing any aspect of panhandling is not the best way to get to this goal. The City should place an immediate moratorium on enforcement and then proceed with a rapid repeal to avoid potential litigation, and then develop approaches that will lead to the best outcomes for all the residents of Elgin, housed and unhoused alike.

We look forward to your response on or before September 28, 2018.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Diane O'Connell". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Diane" and last name "O'Connell" clearly distinguishable.

Diane O'Connell  
Community Lawyer  
Chicago Coalition for the Homeless

Rebecca K. Glenberg  
Senior Staff Counsel  
ACLU Illinois

Eric S. Tars  
Senior Attorney  
National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty